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, ...... ,,,~ __ ctive :Sargainhig aa.ad Collective Relations 
-: Mechanisms as Correlates of Harmonious · 
. Industrial· Relations In the Oil Industry: 
·. 
A Study ofTo~nl Nigeria PLC 
Awe, Kayode Obq/eml (P!JD) •. 
Alatis!te, Momt!f"A . 
and 
Tugl?ul~u. !Jn/a 
bargaining and collective relations mec!Jan.isms ·are _key 
in the sys-tem of labour admfnistral{nn, imd essential 
of organizational success. This st1u~v Wl{S cap:ied out.to 
assess the role of collective · hwgaining and ·collective 
mechanisms as correlates ~/ harmonio_ll.\'•. iHdu.stt:~c.Jl 
oil in.dustry, .a study ofTotal Nigeria Pic. The.shuly 
consisted of . one ilundretl . and j orty-(h_ree (I 4:}) 
fivm the headquarters C!(tlw orgtmization. The survey 
adopted }or the study. _Stmtijied smnp/ing_teclm_ique was 
-s,ele¢1 the respondents.f(Jrthe ,y/1/l~V. The main_ insn·ument of 
,,..,.,,,., is the. questimmalre. Descriptive sfatist~c.v such· as 
· per centage and ji·equency tables · were used. ifJ . the 
tqtion and analysis of data, while the relevant hypothese_.\. 
te~ted.:using. correlation coe.fficients. 1\.vn hypotheses were 
·{h~ alt~rnative hypothes.es were accepted. Thejindingsfro!Jz 
v.ucJ•tne~~·es · revealed that tlwre is a sign(ficant relationship 
ejj'ective collective bargaining and . c:oll~ctive relations 
·.and the . enhancement . t~l . harmouiou~· · iJJ#.ItJtria/ 
in the organization. At.~o. a .~igni/icant relali<;nslzip was 
·hef'rveen ' collective bargaining am/ collective , relations · 
and workers' pmdw:til'i(l' In the Ot'}.faJdzation. The 
recommended a triangulated eJJ'ectual collective 
. · ... 
361-----
~=··· :~.{' ~:·· ~ . ,g~ining. colle~tive relation:( mechaniSms and thid.veloprnen< UJ •uz!>iill&· ·: ~mpfoyment relationS strategies · ds synergetic and 
,sponsiYe•model. This is demonstrated in the Nigerian oil industry 
" aNelo/ dynainie environment of globalization' and competitiveness 
'o that"indust.ial hannonY. and-productivity will be enhanced- The 
'essons:learnt could be applied at both organizational, sectoral as 
well as towllry study levels by means of the above stated formal and 
informal . conflict .management mechanisms, -including a 
reprientation of the attitudes, perceptions; beliefs and behavior of 
the social-partner. · 
J{Oywords: cotiective ' Bargaining, collective Relations 
MeohaniSm; ·Employment Rela-tions Strategies, Industrial 
. , , 0 • _.,·.· ' ••• 
Harmon)', Oillhdu.stry . .. ·. 
Industrial relations is one of the keY elem.en\s in the system of\abour : Introduction \ , · : · 
administration· (Qoo\sanan, 2006), hence an essential predictor of 
. otgaitiZational success. ·There iS a -large bOdY of literature on the 
. :positiVe effects of gOOd· indUstrial relations on companY 
perfonnancei efficiency and productivity which underscores the 
' importance of' industrial· relations in organizatiop31 success 
(Fashoyin, 200 l; Pyman ·et a\., 20 l 0). For instance, Silva ( 199S), 
observes that sound industrial relations is one in which ielationsbips 
· between management and employees on the one nand. and between 
· them and• the statO on the other, are more harmonious and cOoperative 
thim .co.ilflict.-Silva, further maintains that a good industrial relation 
is one• tliat createS an :•environment conductive to economic 
efficiency and the mOtivation; productivity and development ·oftbe empto~ee;-an4· geMrates employee loyalty andmutuattrust. On the othc~ hand, 1'>11-tonnioil· et al. (20J.\) note that good quality industrial 
relattons e!)lerge as .. medi_ating.factors that reinforce, in a positive 
· way,-.the role of innovatiOn activities on workerS' well-being. · 
. . bargaining is centr .I . .· . 
IS a tool throu h . a to any industrial . . . 
. et al; 2007)g· A whtch regul3ted 1\exib:~latwns s~stem 
had theirtenns /umber of studies h ty ts achteved 
there was ani an cond!tionsofem los ow that where 
. 2002; Bear.T!:~ved mdustri31 r~at/;,';::nt suppotr-ed 
that frequent _et al., 2004). Aile envtronment 
and em lo eru~tton of. industri-al ;ole· _et al. (20 10) 
collectiv! b:ee~ m general Cijn be effi on.fltcts between ~""~,·~ ·- and mu rganung has been ilote ecttvely managed 
. by provi~~l understanding be,;~~ help promote 
tssues with t g a framework for de r workers and 
. legal -equi::le':'ort to strike and·l~~~ with industrial 
sful collective bargafd transparent process u!!\f'herefore, 
and peace and . nmg, hence mainte ' wt . result in 
'.. . vtce-versa (G . nance of mdust . 1 
. . omezetal. 2003) na : 
ofthe Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 
no gain saying the f. , . . . . . <· . ' ... · .. , . ·. 
or collect' act that barga' · · .. ,,._, .. " ·"·' 
and we level, is. an es '!''"g . whether anhe' . 
. good mdu tri 1 sentJal pre . . . 
can be appreciated s a relations in Orga :""!mstt~ - for . 
. between em I wbtle taking eognizan mzattons. This 
·' sectors. Th p oyers and employees . cbe of the c6ilflict ese conflicti · . m oth public a · d · 
reconciled and ng . mterests·•- are _n 
. , However in th compromtsed thro . h usually 
such as strik . e event of" no . ug collective 
_patterns are bro~~:;"~nstnttions set i:fo';'ent, various 
affect industrial ha.::. are upoti managemO::~:s and o~her 
s b~gaining consti~: :·~ . organizationa/e';.:n•on, '"'f''~"".lee to satisfY th . n tmportant m . ency. collective bar . e!r economic and· s eans b! whic!> 
. peace in Nige gammg is . crucial to th octal . mterests. 
1D Nigeria cannot :~a~~:~:~~ the collec~i::a:;:f~i~gf guaranteed indust . 1 
. na peace 
. . . 
~·. 
' 
' . .. :. 
·' ,., 
.. ~ 
' 
: and · h_armony and subsequent I y improves industrial harmoi1y 
workers' productivity. The problem is traceable mnjorly to failure to 
honour collective agreement between workers and their employers 
or the lack of recognition of trndc unions on the other hund. The 
breakdown of collective. hnrguining and agreement. in an 
organization usually lends to strikes, absenteeism, sabotage, high 
lab~ur turnover and lnvnrlnbly lower productivity and 
organizational competitiveness. 
•,i . : , 
.•.· .. .. 
Collective hargaining i~ a negotiation process between the 
employers und em-ployees or their associations, on issues 
concerning terms and conditionH of employment. To this end, 
collective bargaining is n potent tool for achieving peace, harmony 
and understanding nrpong the industrial parties, most of the conflict 
that has been occurring In orgunization has been adduced to in 
effective or breakdown or collective bargaining and collectiv~ 
relations machineries. To this end, a Jot of resources and revenues 
have been lost due to crisis in organizations. Added to this, collective 
?nrgai~ing is . equully seen us un industrial democracy whereby 
mdustnal parties co-exist und collectively take decisions that affect 
both th~ organization, individual In the organization and the national 
economy. ~everal rcs~archcrR (Ogheiti.m, 2008) have attempted to 
s~dy the prqblcm of collective hnrgnining leaving behind gaps that i 
need to be fil.!.ed. Those studies hav'? not attempted to relate in-depth 
~tudy ~ollectiv.c bnrgnining_ nnd collective mechanism directly in 
mdustnal relut1ons in the oil industty. Also, the mentioned studies 
(lmafidon; 2009; J Lo;·2002)""httd different independent variables 
an.d were cond~cted in dillbrcnt contexts w~ichjustify the need for 
th1s study. !hts rcscElrch ,study ls carried out to fill the gap in 
knowled~e tn ~hese nreas regarding the role of collective bargaining 
. a~d. relationship mec.hnnisms in nohieving industrial harmony in the 
?tlt~du~try the spectfic case stucty of n major oil company, and the 
Imphcatrons nnd tp solu~ionR to ccon_omic recession in Nigeria. 
. ~ . . 
vc IJArgalnlng 
· collectlvo bargaining has been vnriouHiy defined by 
stll and Roclulists in the history of industrlirl relations 
. ~or the proper understanding o(thc cnrH:cpt, let us 
.some ofthose definitions. collective bargaining is a fenn 
by Beatrice Webb in the 19th cenlury tn dosci-lbe the 
t concerning p~y nnd other conditions of employment 
ween tho trade union On the one hnnd and Crt1(1loy~ers on 
hand; menning a negotiation in which th(• c·r:nploye~s do 
n indivldunlly, nnd on·. their own behnl f, but .do so 
ly through their representati~e which in rnnHI cns~s is ~ 
;..,..,dnll 
Tayo Fn11hoyin, <feftnes collective . bargnlninj/ as a 
. . . . :) . 
nery for dis-cussion and negotiation, whelhei· (orlnal or 
I, between employers nnd workers repfesentntlve aimed at 
ttg mutuul agreement or understanding on ihe. general 
ment relationship in the ·work place. However, Ubeku · 
. collective bargaining as negotiation ubou! worjcing 
tl9n and terms of employmen~ between the employ~t:, a 
of employees' organization on the one hand, nnd ·orie or 
. rcpresentntiyc ofworket·s organization ns on thu other &a~d 
. view ofreaching agreement. ·.·. : ·· 
(2003) gives meaning to ·the concept or collective 
lng by stnllng !IS fpllqw~; ."Collective bargulnlng is th~ 
· by _which employers and prganlzed grou/1s Hce~ . to 
clle their conflicting goals throug 1 mu.tual 
modntlon". Thedynantlc of collective bargaining demands 
. oncesslons, ltB objectives is agreement unlike mere 
lion; therefore, collective bargaining procc!HH aHsurnes · 
, I 
·; :.• .. 
. ~ 
' i 
' ~ 
i 
i 
l 
i I . 
I 
l 
·, ;: :. ~ ' . . . 
willingness on each side . not to listen and to c 
representativen.ess of the other, but also to abandoh fixed 
where possible in order to find common ground. The 
Lapo~r Organiza_tion (1976) defirted collective 
~egotiat.ions about working conditions and terms of 
between· a~ employer, a. group of employers or one or 
workers representative organizations on the other, with a 
reaching a,n agreement. .. 
There ·are several .essential f~atures of collective 
which cannot be reflected in a.single definition or 
the· process. It is not equivalent to collective bargaining· 
collective bargaining refers to the process or means ;md · 
agreement to the possible ies_ult of bargaining. 
bargaining may not always lead to collective agreement; it 
restore the unequal bargaining · process position 
employers and employees;. it is a method used by trade 
improve the terms and conditions of employment of 
ineinbers; where it leads to an agreement, it modifies 
. ·replaces the individ1Jal:'s con~ract of employment; the'"'""·""""' 
bipartite, but in some developing countries, the states and 
other stakeholder play a role in the form of a conciliator 
~greement occurs or where collective bargaining infringes 
government policy, : .goverrianc·e, public service safety · · 
s~cunty (Goolsaran, 2006). · 
: .. ~ 
It is noteworthy at this juncture that most of the ... .,.J,uu.~'u'"" 
_"collective bargaining" got their stem from the work ofBeatrice 
Sid hey Wepb, and this explain~ why the above definitions were 
sin1ilat. Collective bargaining is _the main machinery which: 
employer and trade unions use to ·consider demand and 
conflicts. The union use to conSider demand and resolve 
The . o~her . ways ·include informal stakeholders' 
and communication (Awe, 2013). The difference 
could be found in the type of subjects discussed, the 
~;a~...uu•5 agreements; the authority of the meeting and the: 
of the parties for the decision reached. 
is. a process often used where management appear 
· workers may be called upon to express their views on 
......... o·.,., thus may pr may not have bearing on what they 
,_, .......... ~ ...... . The employer in t_his case plays dominant role. Joint 
could be defined as meeting between the worker and 
where the relationship is seen not on terms of 
· strength but in terms of their work · and ability to 
t~·the.subject being discussed. Here, discussions focus on 
:mutual interests to both sides. Subjects like welfare, 
· productivity and .others,· are dealt with . in joint 
The collective bargaining ·process _ represents 
~tiatfa,p:· on issues in which both the trade union and their 
have claims and divergent view~. The classical examples 
salaries. The process is colleCtive because it replaces . 
. 's weak attempts to effect changes in his conditions. of 
· The process is a bargaining relationship in the sense 
· :'i$· based on give and take, compromise, co~c~ssion a~d 
greem•ent That is, each side yielding here and gammg a pomt 
collective relations mechanisms include lapour . and: 
settlement courts and .institutions, informal and cultural 
intervention, industrial relations ·environment and 
-~ .. ,, .... ,u · relations climate. Business ethics, strategic and 
>nttnutm.s. · re-orientation of attitudes, knowledge, behavior, . 
skills re-orientation and awareness qfthe social partner 
. ' . a§ tripar:tite of voice, equity and jus~~ce among ~arti.es, 
"'"'·'"'"'•~n . procedure . effectiv~ consultative and comnuuuc_att~e .. 
and wage response. 
• 
> 
·. ·! 
' 
,, 
~' 
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Industrial Rctntiuns Environment 
Industrial Relations Environment refers to the atmosphere, norms, 
attitudes and behuv-iours reflecting and underpinning how 
workers. unions und mnnngera interact collectively with each 
othe'r in the workplace, which in turn, affecting workplace 
outcomes (Kersley ct nl., 2006: Pyman et at., 2010), workplace 
environment and the contextual factors are sometimes described 
as the industrial relntions climuto and this concept has been used to 
explain behaviour and attitudes in the workplace, and interactions 
between unions, cmployocs and employers. Industrial relation 
environment· therefore depicts the state and quality of union-
management relations in nn orgnnization. Industrial relations 
environment can therefore be scribed ns functiOJi of work practices 
(the organization of work) and employment practice~ - the 
management ofpeople,und thus may be lik_ened to organizational 
performance- company nnd worker outcomes (Awe, 20 13). 
Bendix (20 16). Snappe, (2006); state that industrial relationR 
envirorunent hus been identified us u key mediator factor in the link 
1 between high-perfonnnnce work sys-tem organizational 
performance and eOectivcnesH (Kerslsy et al., 2006). 9Lher 
outcomes thnt have been thund to be associated with a favo~rSJ.ble 
industrial relations clirhntc in-clude positive perceptions of 
organizationnl prestige, ptlsitivc attitudes towards supc~isors, 
reduced absentees, tumovcr nnd conflict, innovation, customer 
satisfaction and service or product quality (Lee, 2009). According to 
Khan (2006), stable ·industrial rclntions climate is therefore vitally 
important for the economic growth of nny country. This observation 
is con·sistcnt with a study by Ooolsarnm (2006) which revealed tbat 
the climate of labour and industrial relations in ~my country has n 
direct impact on its economic and social development, which 
requires 1\ (avourable environment in which labour relations can be 
conducted in an ord~rly and rc~ponsiblc manner. · 
nn el 'at., (20 I 0) ooncludo that empl?yees' pen:cptlunH of the 
18triol re-lations climate nre more hkely to be lhvourablc if 
· huve access to direct-only voice nrrangemc111s. Where 
ng"mcnt is perceived ~y emplo.yees to oppoHe Jillions, the 
uslrial rotations climate 1s more hkel~ to b~ ·reporl~~ u~; poor. 
1 ( 1997) therefore identifies six dJmensiOnH ol mdustnal 
··ons that can be used to measure induHtrlul r{~lations 
ronment namely: union managemen~ coo_rerntlon, mutual 
~.pnthy,jointpnrticipallon, hostility and tmsl. 
. . 
'r~s of Collective Bargaining in the Upstrenm Oil and 
ln-dustry · · · 
· 1978, the structure of collective barga.inlng In the Nigerian 
vntc sector had been predominantly multi:employur (suctoral) 
· ining, i.e. at tho Industry level as a result ofbi11h ol'indus!Jial 
nloniRm through legislation. Company levf?ll?argninlng u~istas 
· I· hut sectoral or induHtry-wide bargaining IH dominant ~·any level bargnining is what obtains In the ~lgorlnn l)il and 
. sector. This tlppenrs to be general trend Ill oil ?ltd gas 
!t:IPDilies In somu other co\lntries. "Collec.tive bnrgnln111g m~y 
bo orgnnlzed at the national, sectoral, enterprtse or utllu~tory level 
·. ·rat ti combination of these levels. In the oil and guH Industries, 
1or.e Is clenr trond towards decentralization by etllphnsizing 
t~-rpt· i se-lovel bnrgnlning Negotiation at the' e!l!c'rprlse level, 
which con mean at the company division level or evanut tl1e plant 
. t~ye l lmve 1·eported to the ILO by Argentina, C'hinu, Finland, 
· hpnn~ Mnlaysia, Phlllppinos, Poland, Romanln, Singapore, 
Thallnnd and Turkoy" (Internntional Labour Organlzntlon, 2003). 
. J.n the upstream oil and gas . Industry in ~igcrlt~, coll:ctivc 
. hargabtlng at the company level occupies o pn~: nt P!acc 1~ the 
J.luterrninnt.lon of employment ten:ns and condttw~R- fh ls ~~so 
bocnuse In the Nlgcrinn oil nnd gas sector them 1~ no ll~nous 
s·lngulnt· employerH body for regulating ter~s ~-ml .~undllton of 
369-
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·. : ·1 • men,t and ·as such, enterprise/company bargaining has 
emp oy · · f h ·1 d 
fl ···shed in the. private sector, w1th the exception o t e 01 an oun · . · · d 
gas ·industry ~n? print ~e~ia indust?es, there ex1st _an m u_stry-
wide national JOint negotiating Qounct~ for each s~ctor. the natiOnal 
joint negotiating councils have functioned r~latt,v~ly well_except 
that collective agreement freely entered mto are subJe~t. to 
ministerial approval by · the minister of l~bour and product~vt~. 
Collectively bargaining·ip the. upstream ml and gas compames IS 
done at the company level. It is the only industry in Nigeria where 
. collectively bargaining .is done solei~ at the company lev~l 
· (Imafidon, 2009) . . PEN9ASSAN, wtth current me~bersh1p 
strength of21,000 in 101 branches (PENGASSAN website, 2009) 
and NUPENG are the only two unions to which all the represented 
employees in the industry belong. · · 
There are chapte~ of the .umbrell~· unions at the company levels 
· ~md these chapters are the vehicles for collective b'argaining with 
the management . of the respective companies. Almost all ~he 
ups_tream, companies run a two years cycle _on coHect~ve 
agreerpent tenures. Typically, .there are wage re-~peners (t.e. · 
collectively bargaining strictly focused on the cash ttems of the 
collective agreement) one year into the two-~e~r agreeme?t. 
(PENGASSAN CBA, 2007). The collective bargammg pr~~ss UI· 
the upstream oil and gas ind~stries. transcen~s. the tradttlo~al 
compensation, .benefits and ..yorkmg co?d1t1o~s of . un~on 
members· the unions have been very strident m stretchm~: 
discussio~ and negotiations to iss{Jes like expatriate quotcr · 
utilization, promotions, performance marui.gemen~, forms of 
employment relationships etc. (imafidon, 2009, .faJana, 2009). 
This is a unique feature ofthe oil and gas sector: unions in the o~~r 
. sectors stay closer to the traditional content of collective 
_bargaining than the oil and gas. Collective agreement are t~o 
parts; the substantive and proce~ural agreements. The subst~nttve 
·agreethent relates to wages/salaries, hours of works and terms and 
itions of employment whilst the procedural agreement 
to procedures to be followed. in the event of dispute 
, periodicity of meetings, and duration of agreement 
alia. Mo~t labor-management ten~ion is recurrent in their 
because contracts are regularly· renegotiated. Iri the oil and 
sector this is embarked upon every 2 years. According to 
eHV .... _and Witney (2004), no contractual i~sue can ever be said to 
permanently resolved in. most cases the unions present a 
l0J:~ted list of demands which is greeted with management's 
~, ... ~:~,~,~ ........ offers that are usually lower than the unions demand .. In 
'·,;:'-"' .. '!'~·:J negotiations, parties exhibit adversarial behaviour leading · 
~ltmate of distrust. Animosity and suspicion which often lead 
. .,., .... ,,..,v ...... ct. • 
A:cGording to Dubin (1954), as cited in Rose (2008), collective 
barg~ining is the great social inventio.n that has institutionalized 
· ndustrial conflict. This implies that without collective 
·· · ning, industrial conflict. 'Phis implfes that without 
· l~cti~ bargaining, industrial conflict would threaten not only 
·industrial order but also soCial · stability~ But owing to the 
. interest of the parties and their bargaining powers, a 
is usually arrived at and, in most cases it is usually in · · · . 
T"'"'"'"rofthe unions especially in the oil .and gas sector because of 
volatile nature of this sector. Since the employers· i.n the 
oil and g~s industry dea~ to shut down productior:t for a 
many strike ultimate by the unions even ·when such 
~re exorbitant and unrealistic because of the catastrophic 
;:ettects of industrial action in the oil and gas industry be it the 
or downstream sector. ·ubeku (1983) has ·this ·to say 
ng the impacts of strikes on t~e state/society. "Strikes, 
major one, in a developing country like Nigeria always 
dramatic e~ects on the pu~lic. Thi~ is particularly so in th~ 
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c~se or cerlnln essen.tial i~dustries. In 197.5, n ~.i~~Ie strlk" ul:llon 
by tanker drlv1:rs who delivers fuel and d~esel otl from port11 nnd 
the only rolinery at Port Harcourt to all purts of the country 
virtually purulyzcd the whole Nation. Passenger transport wus 
grounded nnd '"industries. could· n~t functl~m" .. The strategic 
position ot.:cupied by the 01l and gaH mdustry 111 N1geriu hus givon . 
the un ionH in the upstream and downstream sectorH eJwrmous 
advanlngo 1\llcl such could bring economic nctlvlties ton totul hnlt 
whenever lheir demands are delayed or arc not met. WagcH und 
conditlonH u.f einployment in the Nigerian 11pstrcam oil und gus . 
sector havu )Jl:en detennined overtime more by the lmrgulnlng 
power of I li e unions than the traditional markots oriented HUpply-
and-demullll determinants. This is IIUe for both the internatlonul 
and the indigenous oil companies (lmafidon, 2009). The union's 
enormuuH huq.caining power and .steadfastneHs in protocling lhe 
interesl ol'lholr membcrs.are likely In be suHtnlned into the future. 
Effect of Collective Bnrguining Prucc!48 on luduslrlul 
Rclatinnsll:nvi-ronment 
According lo Cole (2002), collective bargnlnlng procesH begin~ 
with the union's cln.im, which is followed by an lnltiul counter.: 
offer from mnnage·ment. Once, management ini-tial rosponse hils 
been mndclhen negotiation can commerce In eurnest. Cole further 
·points outli111tln most cases, a settlement is reached wlll~oul und~~· 
delay unci m.:rlmony, und the agreed tenns of the settlomentnn~ . 
published, impleinented and subsequently monitored. Each side -_ 
has therefore lo decide its overall objectives or strategy, usses Its 
relatiw burgalning strength, an~ in the light of tbat ossessmtmt, 
decide on 1 he tuctics to be employed to achlovo un optimum t·os~lt. 
According In Aluchio (1998), the process IH thut the union submllil. 
its prohlc111 to management in writing within n rea!lonable tlrne. · 
Hence, coiluctlvc bargaining Is a union initlutcd process nntl that I 
loyces did not form collectives uud dcmanu lhut employers 
· · in with them, bargaining might never occur (Bendix, 2001 ). 
process :herefore pre~lude the e1~11?Ioye~ tro.m takin~ ~ny 
ilateral actJOn by changmg the cond1t1on ot wh1ch bargmmng 
akes place between a negotiation team consisting oftop managers 
L:nd company trade union representatives. The study po~nts out 
~t on the employer side, the management board appomts the 
~esponsible for collective bargaining. On the employees' 
respondents reported thut shop stewurds initially have 
ngs with all members with ull membl!rs to discuss th.eir 
. Subsequently, union representatives gather to dec1de 
collective bargaining proposul und the ncgoliation team. Thus, 
c{ence suggests that unions make on effort to find out member's 
nds, but the procedure used to decide llw negotiation teams 
both sides is generally top-down. 
, .. 
. .... nlnl •'7, et ~I. (20.03) explains that purtics arc said to be showing good 
in bargaining when; they arc willing to meet and confer with 
other at a reasonable time und place; they are willing to 
over wages, hour and conditions of cm~ploymenl; t!ley 
:a written contract that formulizes their agreement and binds 
to it; and ~ach party givoH the other udequute notice ·of 
or modification of the labour agre'emcnt before it 
Similarly, there should also be u genuine willingness on the 
of the parties to give and take at the bargaining table, 
ion and con-sideration uf fuimess under the process. 
bargaining process is thus expected to be fuir and legal, 
should take place in an environment of trust in order for parties 
<!Chieve a workable relationship. Colle~live bargaining process is 
-- · expected to affect induHirial rclutions environment. The 
shows that collective bargaining process influences the 
of industrial relations. However,· the literature decries the 
or limited scholarly contribution on industrial relations from 
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developing nations and ~ore so the Africa continent (Pyman et al.,· 
2010; Wood 2008; Wood and Dibben, 2006; and Budhwar, 2003). It 
is hoped the study will fill this information gap and stimulate more 
research on industrial relations from this part ofthe wor.ld .. 
·Importance of Collective Bargaining 
The following constitutes some of the importance of collective 
bargaining to employers;. it becomes easier for the management to' 
resolve issues at t~e beginning level rather than take compliance of 
individual workers; collective bargaining tends to promote a sehse · 
:of joint security among employees and thereby tends to reduce the 
cost of labour turnover to management' collective bargaining 
opens up the channel of communication between the workers and 
the management and increases workers participation in decision 
making. To what extent is workers interest or bargaining · 
protected? Collective bargaining plays a vital role in settling and · 
preventing displ,ltes. · · · · 
Bargaining Power .. · 
Bargaining power is a concept related to the relative abilities of 
parties in situation to extent influence over each other. Ifboth parties· 
are on equal bargaining power, such as a perfectly competitive · 
market or between an evenly mat.ched monopoly and mo'nophony. 
There are a number of fields wher~ the concept ofbargaining power 
has proven tp curtains coherent analysis, · game theory, labour . 
· · ·.economics, collective ·bargaining arrangement, the price · of 
: insurance, diplomatic negotiation, $ettlement of litigation and are 
negotiation in general. Bargaining power is often expressed as a ratio 
of party's ability to influence the other participant, to the cost of not 
. reaching an agreernc:nL Lu the purly. i) BPA (Bargaining Power of A) 
. := (benefit and costs that can be inflicted upon B) A'S cost of 
agreeing), ii) BPB (Bargaining power of B)= (benefit and costs that· 
: . can be inflicted uponA)B?S cost of not agreeing). . 
is 
~greater than BP.B, then" A" has a greater bargaining power 
and the result agreement will tend to favour "A". The 
-i~ the case is expected if "B" has greater bargaining power 
simply put bargaining power in negotiation is the ca-pacity 
party to dominate the other uue to its intlucnce, power, size or 
combination ofdi tll:rcnt persuasion tat;tics. 
nflucncing Bargainin~ Power 
ning power is not the monl~poly of either party. Once any of 
rs determin-ing it changes, the power and outcome of 
ng may change at any given point in lime. This explains 
ways say bargaining power is transient in nature. Those 
influencing bargaining power 1:1111 be clitegurized into two 
, nam~ly; internal fuclors and external raetors. 
· r Bargaining Criticism 
critics stress. the imporlunce or bargaining power in 
'"'~1'-•1 11)-; wages and em-ployment, shi fling them away from · 
and demand equilibrium or replacing supply and demand 
ly as the determinant or wages. 8urguin power may be . 
by employers or both employees. Employer 111ay 
the wages by restricting them, living when the wages are 
supply and demand·cqui!ibi-ium. However, if employer can 
competition for labour, they can kcc_p wugcs down and pro tit 
Some critics believe this Is possible because labour markets 
· ically segtnented by skill, experience and location. As a result 
segmentation, they tee! muuy labour markets are dominated 
c buyer (called monuphuny), ur a lew buyers (called 
Employees may ulsu keep tlteir wngc costs down by 
mination paying different wngcs to different workers and as 
as possible, paying each ur lhc minimum necessary. some 
· l?yces may accept lower wugcs that others rcjet:t because their 
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alternalivcu me . limited by gender, race, nge, disability 
unpredlctaldc personal characteristics having worse altcrnati 
they muy i1l'l:ept lower pay and thus, ullow employers to cxp:u 1d lh 
workforces \vithout moving up the lubour supply curve und pnyil 
higher wagl!s overall. Again,, strong competition for labour wou 
tend to limil (perhaps not eliminate) wugediscrlmination. . 
On the employee's part, labour unions can fuvour the employ 
bargai11ing power (again) by limiting competition for jobs umo 
the cn1ployec~1 and potential em-ployees where thus is ~c 
succesHful. it leads to "Collective Bargaining" bctwl!en 
employerH. nnd employe~s. that is tlte uni~m or u group of un 
and the Clllployer or a group of employer together negoli.nl 
contral't tl111l determines wages and conditionH lor a whole 
of employees, Homctimes a whole imlustry or u group ol"indust 
This factor mny be exaggerated why about 20%, of lhc Amcr 
Labour Force il; union-ized, but unions are more importnnt in so 
other indu::~lri~dized countries and collective bargaining sell 
may iutlucncl: the wages and conditions for non-uni~n 
employees. A I so, a group of employees muy final mean~ ,, 
limiting their t:ompctition in the apsence of unions. In the 
of any union,\\ hen wages are detennined by industrial bargain. 
the bargaining of the individual workers may be an illiJ 
influence on wages. This is especially likely when Cl 
·practice wuges discrimi~ation. 
Types ufCullcctivcBargaining . 
Richard n11d Mckersie identified four models of burgul 
relaliouship. However, two models wero propounJed 
Chamberlin nnd Kuhn, all of which would be given 
attentinn. The types offered by Walton nnd Mekcrsie 
Distribution hurgaining ii) Integrutive burguining. Iii) In 
organizatiuual bargaining. iv) Attitudinal Structuring, the 
propounded by Chamberlin and Kuhn are: i) conjunctive 
ining and ii) Co-operntivc bu rgaining. 
pirical Rcvic':. . . . . 
mber of empmcal articles hn ve analysed the cffe~ts of unwn 
ining on em-ployment growth. Machine and Wadhwani 
) only observe negative employment effects of union 
ition in plants experiencing orgat~izational change, Blanch 
and Burgess ( 1996) do uot 1ind union recognition to be 
to the absolute growth mlc ofcmploymcnt, and Bryson and 
lsen (2008) use WERS panel data for the period 1998 to 
and observer no correlation between employment growth in 
sector and various measures of unionism, also taking 
plant closures. 
and Dale-Olsen (2008) even tind positive eflects of changes 
density on changes in employment growth. Twning to the 
'States, Leonard ( 1992) uses a cross-section of Califbmian 
ing plants 'with collective bargaining grew by 2% to 4% 
in non-unionized plants. Branan; eta!,. ( 1994) detect for a 
of large plants from Bure~iu of Labour Statistics, that a l 0% 
in union coverage is assot:iatcd with a 0.5-1.1% decrease in 
growth. Five (5) newer studies. try to establish causal 
by employing e.g. a regression discontinuhy design which 
the fact that legal recognition of a· trade union according to 
ionallabour Relations Act requires an election· among the 
While Di-Nardo and Icc (2004) lind no impact of 
on hours of work, the Hndings for nursing homes by 
et al,. (20 12) are in sharp contrast, their estimates indicate · 
of work (as a proxy for employment) decline dramatically 
of union certification. · 
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· Mcthoclolo~y , . ~ . 
The survey dcHign was adopted for the study. Struldwd IHIInpltng 
technique wus used to select the rcllpondcnls lor the study. Tilt: · 
main lnslntnH;nt of data c?llcclion. iH the qucs-tinnnnirc. 
Descriptive ~lulislics such as simple per ccntnge and l"requmll:y 
tables were 11scd in the presentation nnd ann lysis of uutu, whih! the 
relevau! hypotheses were tested usi11g correlullon coeflicients. 
HypotllcsuN '1\!sling . · · 
Pearson Cmrclntion wns used to men sure the eiTect of independent 
varial?le lot he de-pendent variable ofhypothl~SIH 1, tn 2 nnd proper 
interprctnllun nnd annlysis techniques were m;cd to cxplnln the· 
hypothcscH le:-~ling._ · 
HypothcsiH (I) 
Ho: There is no significant relationship between collective 
bargaininl! aud collective ·relations mechnnisms unci the 
enhancement of harmonious industrial relulions in the oil 
company. 
HI : Then! iu significant relationship bot ween 
bargai11ing and collec-tive relations mcchunismH und 
enhancement of harmonious industrial rclutions In lhc 
compa11y. · i · 
Dcscripth·•~ Sl11tistics 
Mem 
1.7324 
Relltioru 1.8029 
pn•·nmcl ric Co rrclatlou N 
rrclnHon!l 
i' 
Bu- Pe~lton Co~b.tiun 
Si!! (2· uil7d) 
N 
Per· I'euson Correb.ti.nn 
Si!! (2-t~iled) 
N 
1rrelntion is signilicant at the0.05level (2-tai1ed). 
llumo nious; 
l ndusb • ~l Re-
I ~ lion. 
. ,_, .. 
,flO (I 
.,, 
P-value 5% (P<0.05), then r calculated is less lhim r table 
f2): therefore we reject lhe n_ull hypothesis nnd nccept the 
lemativc hypothl~SI!i. 
· tcl:(ll'dnl'lon ol"ltc!lult · · . . 
10 rerntlt nbove Hhnws thai there is a significa111 rclollonshtp 
oun eollccllve bar-gnining structured pulicit·s and 
tcemcn t or ho rmonl nus industrlu I rc lull ullH hi the 
niznllon. The correlation co-efficient shows lhul !here is a 
pnsitlvc relntlon-ship oxrsting between the dependent a_nd 
dependent variable with the vulue ofO. 774. · 
. . ' 
husls (2) . . 
1;' ·There Is no significant relationship between collective 
inlng und collectlve mechanisms processes n11d wmke(s 
1;odue1ivily In the organization. ' . 
t~ · There is Hlgnificant relationship between collective 
• k , 
rgnining nnd collcc-llve mechanisms proccsse11 und wor er s 
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productivity in .the organization. 
Descriptive Statistics 
.Me.Jn 
C ollccti've Bug.Dn- 1.9577 
ina 
'Worker:> Productiv- 1.5070 
itv 
Non parametric Correlations 
CorrelaHons 
ICoUwive Bu~:Unin! re1non Corr~Ution 
Si~. •. ~·uil•dl 
N 
:l.'ori:en: f'm.:lucliviry Pcuton Cnrrcbtion 
5i!'. ( 2· ailrd I 
~ 
Std. Deviation N 
1.22401 It 
.59240 71 
Collective 
Bu.uinia~ Work::n Produ.:ti,itv 
l .~01~ 
il . 000 
71 
.sor l 
.000 
i l 71 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05level (2-tailed). 
Interpretation of the Hcsult 
The strategic position oec:upied by the oil industry in Nigeria has 
given the unions in the upstream and downstream sectors 
enonnous advantages and, as such, could bring economic 
activities to a total halt whenever their demands are delayed or arc 
not . met. Wages and conditions of employment in Nigerian. 
upstream oil industry and have been determined over time more by 
the bargaining power of the unions than the traditional market 
oriented supply and demand determinants. This is true for both ti.1c 
international and the indigenous oil companies (Irnafidon, 2009). 
The unions' enormous bargaining power and steadfasL11ess in 
protecting the interests of their members are likely to be stlstainetl 
into-the future. 
monlous indu~trial relations is a sure f1llltll cl~a for 
111jzntionnl aliments becaw;e any move, nltcmpls. ulmlegy and 
cr opcrnlionnl options to get the organizn-tion. huck on its feet 
11ol succeed If the unions/workers are Sttspldous and 
nislic about the move or intentions of by Illllllllgement of 
of the orgnnizutions and the genuine l.!rli 11·ts of the 
uncnl to the ailing organizations and tltl: nutional 
10my nrc not yielding expected positive results bcenusc of the 
, seuled mistru~t between the workers and the mnnngcments of 
organizntionH. Coupled . with the problem from nut the 
izntion::; and the economic recession in quest.lnn like the 
ul economic meltdown In 2008, united workfi·trce11, good 
ment and govemment will easily over-come the problem 
a feuding unions, managements/government Hgcndes . 
lneluslon nnd Recommendations 
. pnpcr wns set out lo examine collective bargaining dynamics in 
Nigerian up-stream oil and gas industry. Collective hurgaining 
In the oil and gnR industry ha~ its own uniquenc:·w comparable 
Liter· workct· pmtective systems. The issue or C:lll ·plnyment 
Llonships in the upstream oil and gus compnnle~ Corm a 
ficunt portion oflhe sources of work stoppages nnd nther fonns 
nl disliam10ny in the Hector. 
the basis of these findings It is evident thut collect lve hurgaining 
s nml collective relation mechanism had a positive Hlgnificant 
nnlndustrialrclntlons environment in oil and Chw Sector. The 
Its therefore c.onfirm the vnlidity of the premise tlu11 collective 
lng proce::;s has a significant effect on industrlul relations 
1. The Hhtdy demonstrated that staffs arc sullsficd with 
lice! ivc bnrgainl11g proees~ in the Oil and Gas .Ycctor. This 
torlo could be opplied in other economic l!eclors parties 
races the spirit of give and take, fairness, ·comntltment and 
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timely implementation of 11grccment a.nd two, i1: n:anage~ent and 
union officinls endeavour .!o ncqt11re negotmtton sktlls and 
knowledge in"labour rclatiOilS mutters so as t~ improve th~ process: 
The study therefore rei11lirms thutundcrstandmg how pmitcs h<1t1dl . 
collective bargaining proecss, is very critical in detcrmin· 
industrial relations environment in organizations. The rcsea 
therefore contributes to advancement of knowledge on the r<?le 
collective bargaining in cnhnncing harmonious industTial · 
in a bid to overcome the ec-onomic recession in Nigeria. . 
Recommendations .. 
The paper recommc~1ded that the govemme~:t, state sta.keholdc~s-, 
political, institutionol, cultmnl should be mvolved 111 confl1cl ·. 
management within an industrinlnational se~up . There.sl.1~uld be_ 
an improvement in strntcgit.: re-orientatiOn, acqutsttwn 
neg·otiation skills, open governance and transparent 
communication in the joint consultation and management by 
objective (MBO) to th~ level nf collective bargaining. The . · 
research also· recommended thnl strong and effective collecti 
bargaining nnd collec~ive rclntio.ns meehanis.m, ;~nd dcvel~pm~nt ­
of cnnbling employment rclntlons strategies 111 the Ntgenan. 
econorhic sectors in a very dynn111ic environment ofglobulization 
ahd competitiveness so thnt 11 ~ynergy of productivity, crcativi~y .. 
and innovations, social, tcc-hnnlogicnl nnd industrial hannonf wtll 
be enhanced. These lessons could be lcamt and applied al both', 
organizational, industrin l sector and national economic 
developmenllcvcl in Nigeria. 
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ed Influence of Physical Work Environment 
· !:ffimployecs' Performance in Sc'lcctcd .Tertiary 
Institutions in Lagos State. 
/Jankole, Akanjt Rafiu (Ph.D) 
Aremo, Michael 
and 
Oderinde, Kunle Michael 
lf{l' examined the composite Ooint) and r~lative il!/lwmce of 
· cal worlc environment on employees' petji.ll'mance in. 
tertiary institutions ill Lagos State, Nigeria. A descriptive 
:research design was adopted and a sample t!f 400 re-
was selected ji-onr three government owned tertiary 
· lions in Lagos State, using multi-stage sampling 
''""''"1/J'I'P ..... Data were .collected with the use of q/1(.'.\'tionnaire 
, d: Physical Work Environment and Hmp/oyees' 
. ance (r=O . .92). Two hypotheses were tested at 0. 05 level of 
ice with the 11se of multiple regression. Ute jlve (5) 
ts of Physical Work Environment (Oj/ke Space, 
iion, Lighting, Noise and Furniture), wl!ich constituted the 
tidelll variables jointly predicted employees 'JJC'J.formance 
E! • respondents (R=O. 760). Specifically, the predictors 
trilmted 57.2% (A((iusted R-,2=0.572) to t!te 1•arlcmcc· o.fthe 
ion variable. 111is contribution .is sign(!lc:a11t rF='.NJ.093; 
0.05). Also, each (~f the Independent variables sign!ficantly 
iJ5) predicted the dependent variables with qJ!ice Space 
the greatest relative contribution ((J=O .. I/2; r= 7 . .159; 
). Based 011 the findings, it was suggested, liii/Oil,lf other 
,· that govemment, especially at Federal and Stttle levels, 
tid cf.'eate enabling and conducive work en11imumc•nt for 
.· a1:1i institution employees 'by ensuring that o.ffic.•e E'TI vinmment 
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